Erwin Rommel : biography
Rommel received both praise and criticism for his tactics during the French campaign. Many, such as General Georg Stumme, who had previously commanded 7th Panzer Division, were impressed with the speed and success of Rommel's drive. Others, however, were more reserved, some out of envy, others over concerns over risks Rommel was willing to accept, and others in the German High Command out of their limited appreciation and acceptance of maneuver warfare.Lewin p. 16 Hermann Hoth, Rommel's corps commander in France, publicly expressed praise for Rommel's achievements, but apparently had some private reservations, saying in a confidential report that Rommel should not be given command over a corps until he gained "greater experience and a better sense of judgment." With Rommel's campaign in North Africa to view in retrospect, Hoth's reservations can be seen as unfounded. Commented Georg Ralf: "Wegen seiner steilen Karriere, seiner Popularität und vor allem aufgrund der Gunst, die er bei Hitler genoss, hatte er viele Feinde in der Wehrmacht" which can be translated: "Because of his stellar career, his popularity, and especially because of the favor he enjoyed with Hitler, he had many enemies in the armed forces."Ralf p. 115
North Africa 1941–1943
Rommel's reward for his success was to be promoted to Generalleutnant and appointed commander of the 5th Light Division (later reorganised and redesignated 21.Panzer-Division) and of the 15.Panzer-Division which, as the Deutsches Afrikakorps,() were sent to Libya in early 1941 in Operation Sonnenblume to aid the demoralised Italian troops which had suffered a heavy defeat from British Commonwealth forces in Operation Compass. His campaign in North Africa earned Rommel the nickname "The Desert Fox" from British journalists.
First Axis offensive
On 6 February 1941 Rommel was ordered to lead the Afrika Korps, sent to Italian Libya to help shore up the Italian forces which had been driven back from Egypt during Operation Compass, launched by British Commonwealth forces under Major-General Richard O'Connor during December 1940. The OKW ordered Rommel to assume a defensive posture and hold the front line at Sirte until May when the 15th Panzer Division would arrive, at which time he could undertake a limited offensive towards Agedabia and Benghazi. Rommel did not agree with this plan, as the terrain showed that Bengahzi was not a defensible location.Rommel 1953 p. 106 The whole of Cyrenaica would have to be captured to reach a defensive line from which Benghazi could be held.Lewin p. 32 The task of even holding the remaining possession of western Cyrenaica and Italian Tripolitania seemed daunting, as the Italians had only 7,000 soldiers remaining on the frontier after O'Connor's successful capture of nearly the whole of the Italian Tenth Army, with 130,000 prisoners taken and almost 400 tanks captured during the previous three months of advance.
On 24 March 1941 Rommel launched a limited offensive with the 5th Light Division supported by two Italian divisions. This thrust was not anticipated by the British, whose "Ultra" intercepts indicated the German high command expected Rommel to assume a defensive stance.. In: Der Feldzug in Afrika 1941–1943 (deutsches-afrikakorps.de). Abgerufen am 24. November 2009. Quote: Schuld an dieser Einschätzung sind die Enigma Berichte, aus denen Wavell ersehen kann, dass Rommel lediglich den Auftrag hat, die Syrte-Front zu stabilisieren, und dass sein wichtigster Verband, die 15. Panzerdivision, noch nicht in Afrika eingetroffen ist. Translated: The responsibility for this assessment are the Enigma reports, which can be seen from Wavell that Rommel only has a mandate to stabilize the Sirte front, and that his most important unit, the 15th Panzer Division, has not yet arrived in Africa. In addition the British Western Desert Force had been weakened by the transfer of four divisions to defend Greece. Ironically, through "Ultra" intercepts the British command was well aware of the German plans to attack Greece, whereas Rommel, the German commander in Africa, was not. The British fell back to Mersa el Brega and started constructing defensive works, with their command not realizing the serious intent of Rommel's actions.Lewin p. 33 Quote: On 30 March Wavell signalled, 'I do not believe he can make any big effort for another month.' Rommel continued his attack against these positions in order to prevent the British from building up the fortifications.Rommel 1953 p. 107 After a day of fierce fighting, the Germans prevailed and the advance continued. By now it was clear to all parties that Rommel had disregarded orders holding off the attack on Agedabia until May. In early April the British Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command, General Archibald Wavell, feeling overextended and fearing being cut off from his supply line, ordered the abandonment of Benghazi.
