Erwin Rommel : biography
Personality
Rommel was fearless under fire, and in battle was often directing fire or leading an assault in the hottest point of decision.Hoffman p. 94 He was wounded several times in both wars, and seemed to have luck enough to survive long enough to become prominent.Lewin p. 244 He was also the possesser of a great deal of moral courage. Commented German historian Hans-Adolf Jacobson: "Rommel was one of the few generals who had the strength to refuse to carry out one of Hitler's orders." Hans-Adolf Jacobson, Sunday Times 1967, Lewin p. 191 He could be difficult on his subordinate commanders. He expected a great deal of himself and much the same for them. He was not known to be open to objections to his plans. He had little patience for junior officers who did not do their jobs properly.Von Luck p. 44 Quote: "I was able to observe again and again - especially in North Africa - how commnders opposed his orders, which often seemed impossible to carry out, and were promptly replaced." In one instance in February 1940 only three weeks after assuming command of the 7th Panzer Division, Rommel found a battalion commander performing below par and had the man relieved of command and sent on his way in 90 minutes.
Friedrich von Mellenthin, who was a key aide on Rommel's staff during the Africa campaign, wrote that Rommel was willing to take chances, sometimes gambling an entire battle on a decision made at the point of contact. This began when Rommel was a junior officer in Belgium and Italy, where he found a sudden decisive move could reap large dividends. It was reinforced by Rommel's experiences during the invasion of France in 1940, where it was clear that his presence at the forefront of the battle was instrumental in creating successful outcomes. But at times in North Africa his absence from a position of communication made command of the battles of the Afrika Korps very difficult. Rommel's counterattack during Operation Crusader is one such instance. It should be noted though, that throughout the desert war Rommel was acting from a position of relative weakness, and so it was necessary for him to accept risks that commanders like Montgomery were never forced to take.Lewin General Fritz Bayerlein, Rommel's chief of staff through much of the campaign, noted that risks taken were made only after carefully weighing the potential dangers and rewards.
Aggressive subordinate commanders, such as Hans von Luck, praised his leadership from the front. Mellenthin questioned this style, noting it led to disinvolvement of his staff officers and created difficulty in maintaining an overview of the tactical situation. Long absences from headquarters meant that subordinate commanders had to make decisions without first consulting Rommel.
Relations with the Italians
Rommel's poor opinion of the Italian military man stemmed initially from his experiences fighting against them in the mountains of Northern Italy in the First World War.Lewin p. 28 His initial disdain was tempered when he came to realize their lack of success was principally due to poor leadership and equipment, remarking succintly in his typical fashion: "Good soldiers, bad officers."Rommel p. When these difficulties were overcome, he found them equal to German soldiers.Current Biography Yearbook 1942 New York: H.W. Wilson, 1943. pp. 701–04. See also: http://www.storico.org/Rommel.htm Rommel's relations with the Italian High Command in North Africa were generally poor. Rommel was sent to Africa to shore up a crumbling situation created under the direction of the Italian command, and though he was nominally subordinate to the Italians for much of the campaign, he was under no illusions as to why he was there. Further, he enjoyed direct access with the highest German political authority, which allowed him a certain degree of autonomy from his Italian counterparts. Conversely, as the Italian command had control over the supplies of the forces in Africa, they resupplied Italian units preferentially, which was a source of resentment for Rommel and his staff. Rommel's direct and abrasive manner did nothing to smooth these issues."Diario storico del Comando Supremo", vol.5 to 9, – Italian Army General Staff Historical Office"Verbali delle riunioni tenute dal Capo di SM Generale", vol.2 and 3, – Italian Army General Staff Historical Office
