George F. Kennan

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George F. Kennan : biography

February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005

The publication of the "X" article soon triggered one of the more intense debates of the Cold War. Walter Lippmann, a leading U.S. journalist and commentator on international affairs, strongly criticized the "X" article.. Lippmann argued that Kennan’s strategy of containment was "a strategic monstrosity" that could "be implemented only by recruiting, subsidizing and supporting a heterogeneous array of satellites, clients, dependents, and puppets". Lippmann argued that diplomacy was the key towards improving relations with the Soviets; he suggested that the U.S. withdraw its forces from Europe and reunify and demilitarize Germany.. Meanwhile, word soon leaked out that "X" was indeed Kennan. This information gave the "X" article the status of an official document expressing the Truman administration’s new policy toward Moscow..

Kennan had not intended the "X" article as a prescription for policy.. For the rest of his life, Kennan continued to reiterate that the article did not imply an automatic commitment to resist Soviet "expansionism" wherever it occurred, with little distinction of primary and secondary interests. The article did not make it clear that Kennan favored employing political and economic rather than military methods as the chief agent of containment.For Kennan’s critique of the "X" article and an account of the circumstances surrounding its publication, see Memoirs: 1925-1950, pp. 354-367. "My thoughts about containment" said Kennan in a 1996 interview to CNN, "were of course distorted by the people who understood it and pursued it exclusively as a military concept; and I think that that, as much as any other cause, led to [the] 40 years of unnecessary, fearfully expensive and disoriented process of the Cold War".

In addition, the administration made few attempts to explain the distinction between Soviet influence and the international Communist movement to the U.S. public. "In part, this failure reflected the belief of many in Washington", writes historian John Lewis Gaddis, "that only the prospect of an undifferentiated global threat could shake Americans out of their isolationist tendencies that remained latent among them"..

In a PBS television interview with David Gergen in 1996, Kennan again reiterated that he did not regard the Soviets as primarily a military threat, noting that "they were not like Hitler". In Kennan’s view, this misunderstanding:

"all came down to one sentence in the "X" article where I said that wherever these people, meaning the Soviet leadership, confronted us with dangerous hostility anywhere in the world, we should do everything possible to contain it and not let them expand any further. I should have explained that I didn’t suspect them of any desire to launch an attack on us. This was right after the war, and it was absurd to suppose that they were going to turn around and attack the United States. I didn’t think I needed to explain that, but I obviously should have done it."

The "X" article meant sudden fame for Kennan, who became the father of the government’s containment doctrine overnight, leading him to write in his memoirs, "My official loneliness came in fact to an end…My reputation was made. My voice now carried.".

Influence under Marshall

Between April 1947 and December 1948, when George C. Marshall was secretary of state, Kennan was more influential than he was at any other period in his career. Marshall valued his strategic vision and had him create and head what is now called the Policy Planning Staff, the State Department’s internal think tank.. Kennan became the first director of policy planning… Marshall relied heavily on him to prepare policy recommendations..

As an intellectual architect of the Marshall Plan, Kennan helped launch the pillar of economic and political containment of the Soviet Union. Although Kennan regarded the Soviet Union as too weak to risk war, he nonetheless considered it an enemy capable of expanding into Western Europe through subversion, given the popular support for Moscow-controlled Communist parties in Western Europe, which remained demoralized by the devastation of the Second World War. To counter this potential source of Soviet influence, Kennan’s solution was to direct economic aid and covert political help to Japan and Western Europe to revive Western governments and prop up international capitalism; by doing so the United States would help to rebuild the balance of power. In June 1948, Kennan proposed covert support of left-wing parties not oriented toward Moscow and to labor unions in Western Europe in order to engineer a rift between Moscow and working-class movements in Western Europe..