Edmund Ironside, 1st Baron Ironside

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Edmund Ironside, 1st Baron Ironside : biography

06 May 1880 – 22 September 1959

He agreed to release two divisions for the "second BEF" in early June, but was dubious about Churchill’s decision to bring home forces from the Middle East and India; even after the fall of France and the potential collapse of the defences in Britain, he still held to his pre-war position that "[it] is essential to hold the East firmly, whatever happens here".Ironside (1962), p. 351 By mid-June, he had begun to collect a scanty mobile reserve – the 8th RTR, with infantry tanks, and six regiments of armoured cars beginning to formIronside (1962), p. 363 – and the pillboxes and coastal defences were being prepared, though he emphasised to the local commanders that the latter "are only meant as delaying lines, and are meant to give the mobile columns a chance of coming up to the threatened points".Ironside (1962), pp. 368-369.

The fall of France led to a brief interlude where the Cabinet debated sending Ironside on a diplomatic mission to meet Charles Noguès, the French commander in North Africa and a personal acquaintance of Ironside’s, but decided to retain him in Britain and send Lord Gort instead. On June 25, he was called to the War Cabinet to brief them on the plans for home defence; his system of defence in depth provided for:

  1. A defensive "crust" along the coast, able to fight off small raids, give immediate warning of attack, and delay any landings.
  2. Home Guard roadblocks at crossroads, valleys, and other choke points, to stop German armoured columns penetrating inland.
  3. Static fortified stop lines sealing the Midlands and London off from the coast, and dividing the coastal area into defensible sectors
  4. A central corps-sized reserve to deal with a major breakthrough
  5. Local mobile columns to deal with local attacks and parachute landings

The plan was "on the whole" approved by the Cabinet,Ironside (1962), p. 371 and by the Chiefs of Staff later in the week.Ironside (1962), p. 374 He was clear in his diaries that he saw the static focus as an undesirable option – "[the] eternal preaching of the defensive and taking cover behind anti-tank articles has been the curse of our tactics"Ironside (1936), p. 354 – but that it was the only practical way to make use of untrained and badly-equipped forces. By early July, he was optimistic that more troops could soon be pulled out of static positions and used in a mobile role, with the Home Guard taking over the local defences, but strongly resisted orders from Churchill to pull divisions out of the coastal areas before they could be effectively replaced.Ironside (1962), p. 383

On 19 July, he was summoned to the War Office and informed that he was to be replaced by Alan Brooke as C-in-C Home Forces, effective immediately. The formal reason was that the Cabinet wished to have someone with recent combat experience in command, and Ironside accepted the dismissal gracefully – "I was quite prepared to be released. I had done my best … I can’t complain. Cabinets have to make decisions in times of stress. I don’t suppose that Winston liked doing it, for he is always loyal to his friends.Ironside (1962), p. 387

First World War

Ironside’s two-year course at the Staff College, which he found unstimulating, was cut short by the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914; on 5 August, he was appointed as a staff captain, and assigned to Boulogne-sur-Mer and then St. Nazaire, both large Army bases supporting the expeditionary force. By some accounts, he was one of the first British officers to arrive in France.Life, 31 July 1939, p. 62. He was promoted to major and attached to the newly arrived 6th Division at the end of October 1914, ranked as a General Staff Officer, Grade 3 (GSO3). He remained with the division, and was promoted to GSO2 in February 1915.

He was promoted to temporary lieutenant-colonel and made a GSO1 in March 1916. He had hoped to be made GSO1 – divisional chief of staff – to the 6th Division, but to his surprise he was assigned to the newly forming 4th Canadian Division to act as its GSO1. Ironside pushed for a hard training regime, intending to get the division to the front as quickly as possible and prevent it being broken up to feed reinforcements to the other three divisions of the Canadian Corps. Because of the inexperience of the divisional commander, David Watson – a volunteer soldier with little professional experience – he found himself almost commanding the division on occasions, noting in his memoirs that Watson regularly passed on Ironside’s orders with his own name attached.Ironside (1972), pp. 70-4; Cairns (2004) On its arrival in France in late 1916, the division participated at the end of the Battle of the Somme, before being moved north to prepare for the attack at Vimy Ridge. During the final phase of the fighting at Vimy, Ironside again took unofficial command of the division, overruling an ambiguous order from Watson – who was out of contact at headquarters – to halt the attack, and personally ordering the leading battalions into action.Ironside (1972), pp. 74-75