Edmund Ironside, 1st Baron Ironside

0
36

Edmund Ironside, 1st Baron Ironside : biography

06 May 1880 – 22 September 1959

Notes

Honours

Ribbon bar (as it would look today)

100px

  • Companion of the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) in the 1915 King’s Birthday Honours.
  • Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George (CMG) in 1918.
  • The Japanese Order of the Rising Sun, Third Class in 1922.
  • Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath (GCB) in the 1938 King’s Birthday Honours. (KCB: 1919.Heathcote (1999), p. 187)
  • Knight of the Venerable Order of Saint John in June 1939.
  • Grand Croix de la Légion d’Honneur in 1946.
  • Croix de Guerre avec Palme.
  • Order of St. Vladimir, 2nd Class.

Preparation for war

He returned home in 1936, recently promoted to full general, to lead Eastern Command, one of the corps-level regional commands in the United Kingdom, responsible for a single regular division and three Territorial divisions.Ironside (1962), p. 21 Here, he realised that a European war would come sooner rather than later, and that the army was in a parlous state to defend the country. However, he found that as with his earlier posts, he could achieve little in Eastern Command – the major decisions would be made in Whitehall. He himself seemed to lose his opportunity for higher office in 1937, when he was rebuked over his mishandling of a mobile force in the annual exercises; until this point, he had been considered a possible candidate as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but was dropped from consideration in favour of Lord Gort, whom Ironside considered unfit for the job. Officially, Hore-Belisha told him he was too old for the post, at 57. He was appointed an aide-de-camp to the King in October, a purely ceremonial position, and early in 1938 accepted the offer of a posting as governor of Gibraltar, generally seen as a quiet role in which to retire.Cairns (2004); Bond, pp. 19-20

He was helped to accept Gibraltar by the suggestion that, in the event of war, he could be transferred to command the forces in the Middle East; as he believed no major force could usefully be sent to France, this seemed to him likely to be the main focus of British attention in the war.Bond, pp. 19-20 He took up the governorship in November 1938, and threw himself into preparing the colony for war; here, finally, he had free rein. Under his tenure, the defences were strengthened and the garrison prepared for a long siege.

In December 1938, only a month after he had taken up the post, Hore-Belisha had begun to consider the possibility of recalling Ironside to become Inspector-General of Overseas Forces. The position gave him overall responsibility for the readiness of forces based outside the United Kingdom, and it was worried by many at the War Office that he would interpret it as a precursor to being given formal command of the Expeditionary Force on the outbreak of war. However, after some debate, Hore-Belisha went ahead and offered Ironside the position in May, appointing a corresponding Inspector-General of Home Forces at the same time, both under Lord Gort.Bond, p. 20 The decision to recall Ironside may have been helped by the fact that Hore-Belisha was particularly reliant on the advice of Basil Liddell-Hart, an old acquaintance of Ironside’s, and was already beginning to fall out with Gort.Bond [chapter on Gort], p. 37

As expected, Ironside chose to interpret the posting as indicating that he was the presumptive commander in chief, and soon began to clash with Lord Gort over their respective powers. Whilst Gort was nominally in a more senior position, Ironside had seniority of rank and a far more dominant personality, and had concluded several months earlier that Gort was "out of his depth" as CIGS; he is unlikely to have shown much deference. He held the post of Inspector for a few months, visiting Poland in July 1939 to meet with the Polish high command. Whilst his sympathetic manner reassured the Poles, the visit may have unintentionally given the impression that Britain was intending to provide direct military assistance. He returned able to report that the Polish government was unlikely to provoke Germany into war, but warned that the country would be quickly overrun and that no Eastern Front was likely to exist for long. His warnings, however, were broadly ignored.Bond, pp. 20-21; Prażmowska, pp. 76-77, 97-98