Francisco Franco

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Francisco Franco : biography

4 December 1892 – 20 November 1975

In early August, the situation in western Andalusia was stable enough to allow him to organize a column (some 15,000 men at its height), under the command of then Lieutenant-Colonel Juan Yagüe, which would march through Extremadura towards Madrid. On 11 August Mérida was taken, and on 15 August Badajoz, thus joining both nationalist-controlled areas. Additionally, Mussolini ordered a voluntary army, the Corpo Truppe Volontarie (CTV) of some 12,000 Italians of fully motorized units to Seville and Hitler added to them a professional squadron from the Luftwaffe (2JG/88) with about 24 planes. All these planes had the Nationalist Spanish insignia painted on them, but were flown by Italian and German troops. The backbone of Franco’s aviation in those days were the Italian SM.79 and SM.81 bombers, the biplane Fiat CR.32 fighter and the German Junkers Ju 52 cargo-bomber and the Heinkel He 51 biplane fighter.

On 21 September, with the head of the column at the town of Maqueda (some 80 km away from Madrid), Franco ordered a detour to free the besieged garrison at the Alcázar of Toledo, which was achieved 27 September. This controversial decision gave the Popular Front time to strengthen its defences in Madrid and hold the city that year, but the holding of Alcázar was an important morale and propaganda success for the Nationalists.

Rise to power

The designated leader of the uprising, Gen. José Sanjurjo died on 20 July 1936 in an airplane crash. Therefore, in the nationalist zone, "Political life ceased."Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, re vised and enlarged edition (1977), New York: Harper & Row. ISBN 0-06-014278-2. p. 258 Initially, only military command mattered; this was divided into regional commands (Emilio Mola in the North, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano in Seville commanding Andalusia, Franco with an independent command and Miguel Cabanellas in Zaragoza commanding Aragon). The Spanish Army of Morocco itself was split into two columns, one commanded by General Juan Yagüe and the other commanded by Colonel José Varela.

From 24 July, a coordinating junta was established, based at Burgos. Nominally led by Cabanellas, as the most senior general,Thomas writes, "to pacify, rather than to dignify, him." op. cit., p. 282. it initially included Mola, three other generals, and two colonels; Franco was later added in early August.Thomas, op. cit., p. 282. On 21 September it was decided that Franco was to be commander-in-chief (this unified command was opposed only by Cabanellas),Thomas, op. cit., p. 421. and, after some discussion, with no more than a lukewarm agreement from Queipo de Llano and from Mola, also head of government.Thomas, op. cit., pp 423–424. He was, doubtlessly, helped to this primacy by the fact that, in late July, Hitler had decided that all of Germany’s aid to the nationalists would go to Franco.Thomas, op. cit., p. 356.

Mola considered Franco as unfit and not part of the initial rebel group. But Mola himself had been somewhat discredited as the main planner of the attempted coup that had now degenerated into a civil war, and was strongly identified with the Carlist monarchists and not at all with the Falange, a party with Fascist leanings and connections ("phalanx", a far-right Spanish political party founded by José Antonio Primo de Rivera), nor did he have good relations with Germany; Queipo de Llano and Cabanellas had both previously rebelled against the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera and were therefore discredited in some nationalist circles; and Falangist leader José Antonio Primo de Rivera was in prison in Alicante (he would be executed a few months later) and the desire to keep a place open for him prevented any other Falangist leader from emerging as a possible head of state. Franco’s previous aloofness from politics meant that he had few active enemies in any of the factions that needed to be placated, and had cooperated in recent months with both Germany and Italy.Thomas, op. cit., pp 420–422.