Zinovy Rozhestvensky

73
Zinovy Rozhestvensky bigraphy, stories - Russian admiral

Zinovy Rozhestvensky : biography

11 November 1848 – 14 January 1909

Zinovy Petrovich RozhestvenskyРожественский. Several other transliterations are also known in English texts. See Rozhestvensky (disambiguation) for more information. () (October 30 (November 11) 1848 – January 14, 1909) was an admiral of the Imperial Russian Navy. He was in command of the Second Pacific Squadron in the Battle of Tsushima, during the Russo-Japanese War.

Admiral Rozhesvensky selected the Knyaz Suvorov, one of four brand new battleships of the French-designed Borodino class, as his flagship for the voyage to the Pacific. Under Admiral Rozhestvensky’s command, the Russian navy holds the record of sailing an all-steel, coal-powered battleship fleet over one way, to engage an enemy in decisive battle.

Honours and awards

  • Order of Saint George, 4th class
  • Order of St. Vladimir, 3rd class and 4th class with ribbon
  • Order of St. Anna, 2nd and 3rd classes
  • Order of St. Stanislaus, 1st, 2nd and 3rd classes

Notes

Russo-Japanese War

Prior to the war against Japan, Rozhestvensky was commander of the Baltic Fleet. Tsar Nicholas II ordered Rozhestvensky to take the Baltic Fleet to East Asia to protect the Russian naval base of Port Arthur. The Tsar had selected the right man for the job, for it would take an iron-fisted commanderPleshakov p. 37 to sail an untested fleet of brand new battleships (for some of the new Borodinos, this voyage was their shakedown cruise) and new untrained sailors on the longest coal-powered battleship fleet voyage in recorded history. Admiral Rozhestvensky, a veteran of the Turkish war,Pleshakov p. 59 had a fiery temper when dealing with a subordinate, and both officers and men knew to stand clear of "Mad Dog"Pleshakov p. 153, 322 when a subordinate either disobeyed orders, was incompetent, or both.Pleshakov p. 38 Rozhestvensky was fully aware that he had a new untrained navy under his command and that re-coaling stations would not be available during the journey, due to Britain’s alliance with Japan; and that both the shakedown testing of the new battleships and the gunnery practice/training would have to occur during the voyage. In addition, re-coaling would have to be done at sea, instead of in port as with most other navies. As a consequence of these circumstances, the mission-minded commander would sometimes fire service ammunition (live gunfire) across the bows of an errant warship, and in a fiery moment fling his binoculars from the bridge into the sea.Pleshakov p. 53 When his battleship fleet set sail in 1904, Rozhestvensky’s staff ensured that his flagship, Knyaz Suvorov, had a good supply of binoculars on board.Pleshakov p. 123

Nevertheless the inexperience of the Russian Baltic Fleet almost triggered a war between Russia and Great Britain as it sailed through the North Sea. After several Russian ships mistook British fishing trawlers at Dogger Bank for torpedo boats from the Imperial Japanese Navy, they opened fire on the unarmed civilian vessels. – Wood Walter, North Sea Fishers And Fighters, K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co, London, 1911 The Dogger Bank incident on the night of the 21–22 October 1904 resulted in the deaths of three British fishermen and many wounded. One sailor and a priest aboard a Russian cruiser were also killed in the crossfire.

The Russian government agreed to investigate the incident following a great deal of international diplomatic pressure. Admiral Rozhestvenski was ordered to dock in Vigo, Spain while battleships of the Royal Navy from the British Home Fleet were prepared for war. Several British cruiser squadrons shadowed Rozhestvenski’s fleet as it made its way through the Bay of Biscay. On arrival in Spain, Rozhestvenski left behind those officers he considered responsible for the incident (as well as at least one officer who had been critical of him). (‘Hullwebs – History of Hull’ website. Retrieved 2007-09-08.) On November 25, 1904, the British and the Russian governments signed a joint agreement in which they agreed to submit the issue to an International Commission of Inquiry at The Hague. On February 26, 1905, the commission published its report. It criticized Rozhestvenski for allowing his ships to fire upon the British ships. But noted that "as each [British] vessel swept the horizon in every direction with her own searchlights to avoid being taken by surprise, it was difficult to prevent confusion". The report also concluded that once the mistake was known "Admiral Rozhestvenski personally did everything he could, from beginning to end of the incident, to prevent [the trawlers] from being fired upon by the squadron". Russia eventually paid £66,000 (£5.8m today) in compensation.International Dispute Settlement – Merills, J. G., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University, 1999